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Operation Warp Speed: implications for global vaccine 
security
Lancet Commission on COVID-19 Vaccines and Therapeutics Task Force Members*
Several global efforts are underway to develop COVID-19 vaccines, and interim analyses from phase 3 clinical testing 
have been announced by nine organisations: Pfizer, the Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and 
Microbiology, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Sinopharm Group, Sinovac Biotech, Johnson & Johnson, Novavax, and CanSino 
Biologics. The US programme known as Operation Warp Speed provided US$18 billion in funding for development 
of vaccines that were intended for US populations. Depending on safety and efficacy, vaccines can become available 
through mechanisms for emergency use, expanded access with informed consent, or full licensure. An important 
question is: how will these Operation Warp Speed vaccines be used for COVID-19 prevention in global health settings? 
We address some key questions that arise in the transition from US to global vaccine prevention efforts and from 
ethical and logistical issues to those that are relevant to global vaccine security, justice, equity, and diplomacy.
Introduction
At the end of January, 2021, 16 SARS-CoV-2 vaccine 
candidates around the world were in phase 3 clinical 
trials, with five of these vaccines funded by a US 
programme called Operation Warp Speed (OWS).1 
Nine announcements of safety and efficacy have been 
made, ranging from 50% to 95% efficacy,2 several 
vaccines have been granted emergency approval, and 
vaccines from Pfizer, AstraZeneca, and Moderna have 
received recommendations from the Strategic Advisory 
Group of Experts in Immunization. OWS has invested an 
estimated US$18 billion mostly in the late-stage clinical 
development and early manufacturing of COVID-19 
vaccines and has agreements in place to buy 455 million 
doses.3,4 OWS is the largest of the global efforts for 
development of COVID-19 vaccines; by comparison, the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) 
invested $1·4 billion in support of the development of 
COVID-19 vaccines. CEPI funding carries commitments 
to ensure global access and affordable cost. Recipients 
of OWS funding also have clear commitments: to the 
USA. Companies that are supported by OWS, and 
manufacturers in Russia and China, have approached 
countries and organisations independently, creating a 
complicated ecosystem for COVID-19 vaccines that is 
comprised of a patchwork of countries that have and do 
not have vaccines.
There were eight vaccines in the original OWS 
programme (but not all have entered phase 3 trials). 
The OWS vaccines that reached phase 3 testing included 
two non-replicating adenovirus-vectored vaccines (the 
AstraZeneca–Oxford chimpanzee adenovirus and the 
Johnson & Johnson adenovirus type 26 vaccine); 
one vesicular stomatitis virus-based vector (Merck–
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative); two mRNA 
vaccines from Pfizer–BioNTech and Moderna; and 
two protein vaccines from Novavax and Sanofi–
GlaxoSmithKline.1 The vaccine from Merck–International 
AIDS Vaccine Initiative has since been withdrawn. 
Vaccines from Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson 
have received US Food and Drug Administration 
approval for emergency use. The European Medicines 
Agency has approved vaccines from Pfizer–BioNTech, 
Moderna, and AstraZeneca. WHO has given emergency 
use listing to Pfizer–BioNTech, AstraZeneca, and 
Johnson & Johnson. Additionally, the adenovirus type 5 
(Ad5) vaccine from the Gamaleya Research Institute of 
Epidemiology and Microbiology has been approved by 
the ministry of health in Russia, the whole inactivated 
vaccines from Sinopharm Group and Sinovac Biotech 
and the CanSino Ad5 vaccine have received approval in 
China, and the whole inactivated vaccine from Bharat 
Biotech has received approval in India. Other countries, 
for example the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, 
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• The USA should accelerate the rejoining of WHO, expand 
its role in COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access, and contribute 
funding and vaccines to this global effort.
• Countries with excess vaccines (which were developed 
through funding from Operation Warp Speed or the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations) through 
preorders should consider assignment of excess vaccines to 
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access and support the 
mechanisms for logistics, implementation, and follow-up 
of vaccinated populations.
• As a continuation of the work of Operation Warp Speed, 
research into efficacy against COVID-19 variants; 
optimisation of schedule, dose, and boosters; correlates of 
protection; effectiveness and herd immunity; long-term 
safety and adverse events after immunisation; and global 
surveillance for mutations should also be used as an 
opportunity to strengthen health systems and research 
capabilities in low-income and middle-income countries as 
a part of pandemic preparedness and global health 
security.
• Operation Warp Speed funding should be followed by 
support for optimising vaccination practice and vaccine 
acceptance worldwide, to counter misinformation and 
vaccine hesitancy.
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Turkey, Brazil, and India (among others), have also 
granted approvals.
Nearly 400 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines have 
been administered, primarily in high-income countries 
that had preordered vaccine but now in other countries 
as well. In the USA, vaccination started in December, 2020, 
and slowly increased to roughly 10% of the US population.
The OWS programme is focused on the USA and 
approval by the US Food and Drug Administration. 
The USA continues to lead globally in the number of 
COVID-19 cases, and its deaths due to COVID-19 are 
approaching 560 000 people in March, 2021. However, 
the global toll of infection (ie, approaching 121·2 million 
people) and deaths (ie, nearly 2·7 million) means that 
vaccines that are developed under OWS should also be 
considered for global distribution. Interestingly, several 
of the com panies that are supported by OWS also 
received funding from CEPI, which should require 
global access. Failing to provide equity in the early 
distribution of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, according to 
modelling by Chinazzi and colleagues, could result in a 
doubling of global mortality.5 Leveraging the efforts of 
OWS for global health and bringing safe and effective 
vaccine solutions to people around the world in a timely 
manner is a crucial endeavour and too important to fail.5,6
The global access gap
Equity and access have been a focus of a previous 
Lancet Commission report on essential medicines.7 The 
biomedical innovation system does not prioritise disease 
that is found predominantly in low-income and middle-
income countries (LMICs), and innovation that is fostered 
in high-income countries, for reasons of cost, complexity, 
or intellectual property restrictions, typically has delays in 
global introduction.7,8 Vaccine technology is not different.
Often it takes years, and sometimes decades, for new 
vaccines to achieve the same level of uptake in LMICs as 
in high-income countries. Rotavirus vaccine, approved in 
2006 by the US Food and Drug Administration and 
approved and recommended by WHO in 2009, rapidly 
achieved 70% uptake in the USA. Worldwide, in 2020, 
less than 40% of children receive three doses of rotavirus 
vaccine.9 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, provides vaccines at 
low or no cost to the poorest countries; sadly the greatest 
burden of unvaccinated children is found in middle-
income countries. To address the gap in access to 
COVID-19 vaccines, Gavi, WHO, and CEPI lead an 
international plan for access to COVID-19 vaccines, 
known as the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) 
Facility, an activity of the Access to COVID-19 Tools 
Accelerator.6,10 189 countries have expressed interest in 
COVAX, and the partnership is working to procure 
2 billion doses of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine 
that has been granted emergency use listing by WHO by 
the end of 2021, which is roughly 20% of the vaccine 
needs of participating countries. $2 billion of investment 
are needed to purchase these vaccines. Over 90 LMICs 
will be eligible to receive 1 billion doses of COVID-19 
vaccines at low (ie, up to $1·60 per dose) or no cost 
through this mechanism.6
Most of the members of the G20, including China, have 
joined COVAX. The Biden administration announced 
its participation and a $4 billion commitment. Through 
financial support for COVAX and integration of timelines 
for vaccine delivery under OWS into COVAX, US 
participation could be decisive. Although there is broad 
support for COVAX, questions persist. The USA, the EU, 
the UK, Japan, and Canada have preordered 8·8 billion 
doses of vaccine, far in excess of need.3,11 To some extent, 
this excess reflects contingent purchasing, but it dwarfs 
the planned purchase of 2 billion doses through COVAX 
and potentially decreases the ability of COVAX to 
negotiate on costs for large bulk purchases.
LMIC challenges and opportunities
Additional scientific issues related to vaccines that are 
now undergoing interim analyses—eg, the emergence of 
mutant SARS-CoV-2 viruses that are less sensitive to 
vaccines than are the original virus, dose and schedule 
optimisation, new adjuvants, correlates of protection, and 
improved surveillance of emerging pathogens—are 
beyond the scope of this Viewpoint. There are, however, 
many questions regarding the relevance of new vaccines 
that are being generated through OWS to target product 
profiles that are required for use in LMICs.
Many deficiencies complicate programmes for 
COVID-19 prevention in low and lower-middle income 
countries worldwide: diagnostic testing; personal protec-
tive equipment; good epidemiological data; logistical 
systems to vaccinate all segments of society; and systems 
for reporting adverse events after vaccination. Social, 
political, and religious unrest can also complicate all 
prevention efforts. Even as OWS vaccines are applied to 
the global campaign against COVID-19, strengthening of 
health-care services in low-resource settings will be a key 
element for successful implementation.
CEPI estimates that 2–4 billion doses of global vaccine 
production can be used for COVID-19 in 2021; modelling 
by the Duke Global Health Innovation Center suggests 
that it could be 2023–24 before enough vaccine can be 
manufactured.12,13 Several companies that were supported 
by OWS have licensed production to other manufacturers, 
including members of the Developing Countries Vaccine 
Manufacturing Network, which provides hundreds 
of millions of doses of vaccines worldwide that are 
prequalified by WHO.14 AstraZeneca–Oxford (UK and 
Sweden) has manufacturing arrangements with Serum 
Institute of India (India), SK Bioscience (South Korea), 
and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Brazil), whereas 
Novavax (USA) has manufacturing arrangements with 
Serum Institute of India (India) and SK Bioscience (South 
Korea). Sinovac (China) has agreements for vialling with 
Instituto Butantan (Brazil) and BioFarma Innovations 
(Indonesia). Johnson & Johnson (USA) will work with 
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Biological E (India) and Merck (USA). Moderna (USA) 
has partnered with Lonza Group (USA and Switzerland). 
Sanofi (France), whose vaccine is delayed, will make the 
Pfizer–BioNTech (USA and Germany) vaccine under 
licence. The global distribution of manufacturing 
COVID-19 vaccine is unprecedented and represents an 
important development not only for supply of COVID-19 
vaccine but also for the recognition and use of vaccine 
manu facturers in LMICs.
mRNA vaccines can be a particular problem as the 
Pfizer–BioNTech vaccine can be stored at –70°C for up 
to 6 months, –20°C for 2 weeks, and 2–8°C for 5 days, 
whereas the Moderna vaccine can be stored at –20°C for 
6 months and 2–8°C for 1 month. Despite improvements, 
at listed temperatures, neither vaccine would be practical 
in many LMICs. Other approved vaccines and many 
vaccines that are still in phase 3 testing can be stored at 
temperatures that are consistent with the target product 
profile that was developed by WHO (ie, 2–8°C for at least 
2 weeks, with long-term storage at –20°C or higher). The 
costs and formidable logistics around cold-chain 
requirements for mRNA vaccines will compound routine 
access and supply challenges.15 Could cold storage 
containers that are used effectively for –60°C storage of 
vesicular stomatitis virus-based Ebola virus vaccine be 
scalable for Pfizer–BioNTech and Moderna mRNA 
vaccines in LMICs?
The 80–85% global uptake for childhood WHO 
extended programme on immunisation vaccines has 
saved 2·5 million lives annually.9 The target population 
for SARS-CoV-2 vaccines includes all age groups, 
although most vaccination programmes do not routinely 
target adults. Due to probable shortages in vaccine supply, 
particularly in the immediate period after approval, 
prioritisation of risk groups will be necessary.10,16,17 
Countries might adopt multiple COVID-19 vaccines; 
however, data do not yet exist for mixing of different 
vaccines as primary series or booster doses. Adult 
vaccination records might become important in this 
regard.15
The ongoing OWS trials (and those of other 
manufacturers) are large, phase 3, randomised, blinded 
clinical trials. These trial designs eliminate confounding 
biases and are excellent for establishing the protection 
of individual participants so that, by intention, com-
munity protection is not evaluable. If the ultimate goal is 
reduction of the morbidity and mortality that are 
associated with COVID-19, then information on 
community protection, or effectiveness, is necessary.18,19 
Evidence of community protection is crucial; it could 
inform government vacci nation strategy and policy 
around ancillary protective measures or justify the lifting 
of pandemic restrictions. Planning for effectiveness trials 
should begin now.
OWS has accelerated the development of COVID-19 
vaccine without compromising efficacy, safety, or 
quality.1 There are, however, long-term safety issues 
that might arise. For example, three Ad5-vectored 
vaccine trials for HIV showed excess HIV infections in 
vaccine recipients; could Ad5-based vaccines for 
COVID-19 enhance HIV infections? Similarly, the use of 
the AS03 adjuvant was thought by some to be associated 
with the development of narcolepsy.20 Rare events, such 
as intussusception after the use of oral rotavirus 
vaccines, might not be apparent, even in trials of 
30 000–60 000 people.21 Vaccine-associated enhanced 
respiratory disease and antibody-dependent enhance-
ment were reported in animals given vaccines against 
SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV;22 fortunately, these effects 
have not been reported in small animal, non-human 
primate, or human studies of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines.23 
However, a long-term effect, similar to the enhancement 
that was observed for the Sanofi dengue virus vaccine, 
cannot be ruled out.24 Disregarding safety can undermine 
public confidence in COVID-19 vaccines and decrease 
vaccination uptake.25 Strengthening of systems in LMICs 
to monitor, record, and report adverse events after 
immunisation will be important given the multiple 
vaccines in use.26
For all of its potential benefit, OWS is a form of so-called 
vaccine nationalism: a country prioritising its own needs 
over the legitimate needs of others.27 Some countries have 
laws that allow them to appropriate vaccine that is 
produced within that country in times of emergency, 
regardless of contractual commitments. High-income 
countries and wealthier middle-income countries have 
confirmed purchases of 5·4 billion doses, whereas LMICs 
and low-income countries have 1·2 billion doses.13 
COVAX is a novel solution, but if COVAX fails to secure 
the necessary doses and distribute equitably, it could 
precipitate a scramble for COVID-19 vaccines that will 
heighten inequity, increase mortality, and extend the 
crisis.5,11 Concern has arisen that the Chinese, Indian, and 
Russian governments and manufacturers might be using 
the pandemic for geopolitical purposes. Given the inward 
focus of OWS and concerns about the remainder of LMIC 
needs for COVID-19 vaccine, a more robust multilateral 
approach to COVAX needs to be pursued.27,28 Can CEPI, 
WHO, and Gavi give COVAX the crucial leadership that it 
needs to become the first international effort to provide 
concurrent access to a “global public good”:29 safe and 
effective COVID-19 vaccines?
Finally, an unintended consequence of OWS is its 
potential effect on vaccine hesitancy. Although overall 
vaccine confidence is robust globally,25 there is now a 
strong element of hesitancy regarding COVID-19 
vaccines in the USA. Among the reasons for vaccine 
hesitancy is the so-called warp speed messaging, which 
has been interpreted by some people to imply that these 
vaccines are being rushed or not adequately tested for 
safety, combined with activities that are connected to 
committed anti-vaccine opposition groups and activists 
who are based in the USA and in western Europe.30 
Increasingly, WHO and other UN agencies will be called 
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on to address a growing infodemic (ie, the deluge of 
information and worryingly inaccurate information) that 
is seeking to discredit vaccines, masks, and other 
COVID-19 interventions.
COVID-19 vaccine security as a global public 
good
According to UNICEF and WHO vaccine security is the 
timely, sustained, and uninterrupted supply of affordable 
vaccines of assured quality.31 Equitable vaccine distrib-
ution, transnational collaboration (including LMICs) in 
development of COVID-19 vaccines, and international 
mechanisms for sharing of data for clinical trials and 
vaccine efficacy in real time will undermine the appeal and 
legitimacy of vaccine nationalism.
The role that intellectual property limitations could play 
in limiting the full provision of COVID-19 vaccines is a 
concern for vaccine security, especially for LMICs. 
Vaccines differ from drugs in several aspects of relevance 
to intellectual property. Vaccines are biological products, 
which are more complex and costly to manufacture than 
are drugs, and for much of the world, are priced for use in 
the public sector.8 Additionally, the involvement of several 
major vaccine manufacturers in LMICs in contract 
manufacturing, in primary vaccine development, and 
under access agreements with CEPI could ensure that 
global supply, once full-rate production is achieved, 
should be sufficient. Crucially, will this production be 
timely and accessible to all countries?
Conclusions
Purchasing data suggest that OWS vaccines, and vaccines 
that are funded by other organisations, are more likely to 
be allocated according to national rather than global 
priorities for vaccine security.11 The supply of vaccines 
to COVAX cannot be an afterthought. As the access 
gap example of rotavirus vaccine reminds us, 11 years to 
40% uptake worldwide of a COVID-19 vaccine will be 
unconscionable failure, and the cost in illness, deaths, 
and disruption will be substantial. Bringing the COVAX 
Facility to a successful launch, crucial vaccine technology 
to LMIC populations concurrent with high-income 
populations, and closure to a pandemic through a co-
ordinated, multilateral solution will be an unprecedented 
expression of support for global vaccine security. In 
showing safety and efficacy of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines and 
preparing companies for large-scale manufacturing, 
OWS has, by accident or design, provided an important 
opportunity. The key to its success will be enabling the 
COVAX Facility to exploit and use this opportunity for the 
benefit of global health and working collaboratively to end 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
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